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FOREWORD
The extensive hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee,
the Committee's monographs and reports, together with the Department of Justice's
ambitious program of antitrust enforcement, highlight the great amount of attention being currently paid-and properly so-to existing impediments to a free cornpetitive market that are the result of private machination. Save with respect to the
interstate trade barrier,' little attention has been directed to marketing barriers that
are the consequence of governmental, rather than private, action. It is the purpose
of the present symposium issue to present an inclusive picture of the extent and
character of internal American barrier walls as they have been erected through
legislation and administration, to probe something of the economic implications of
this rdatively unnoticed development, and to suggest the important bearing of the
publicly created barrier on the immediate national defense effort and on the ultimate imponderables of political and democratic solidarity.
Writing last year on The Bottlenecks of Business' the present aggressive
head of the Antitrust Division tended to minimize the dangers inherent in "public
seizure of power over the market." To him then ". . . the acquisition of power
over the market by public legislative processes is not a serious danger in a democracy checked and balanced as ours is.:" This was ". . . because what has been
granted by the democratic process can be safeguarded and can be taken away by
the same democratic process."4 "It is the private seizure of industrial power that
... can wreck a democracy. That power is subject to no election every four years.:"

Even within his own official family, however, there was dissent from this view of
things;' and, "increasingly disturbed by the amount of state and local legislation"
of restrictive character, Mr. Arnold, in his recent appearance before the Temporary
National Economic Committee,7 testified to the ".... close parallel between private

restraints in proceedings under the antitrust laws and the public or quasi-public
restraints which have become known as trade barriers"' in recommending Congressional action to strengthen Antitrust's hand in so far as that is possiblef
Part 29 of the T. N. E. C. Hearingsis devoted to "Interstate Trade Barriers."
'Id. at 107.
'Id. at iso.
'Auosa,
Ti BorrLaENacis oF BusINEss (1940).
';Ibid. But compare his discussion id. at 42-45, wherein he indicates the greater concern over public
barriers that is evident in his more recent testimony, cited infra note 7, before the T. N. E. C.
'See Edwards, Trade Barriers Created by Btsiness (1940) 16 IND. L. J. 169.
7 See Final Report and Recommendations of the T.N.E.C., SEN. Doc. No. 35, 7 7 th Cong., ist Sess.
'Id. at 269.
'Id. at 270.
(1941) 261 ct seq.
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The closeness of the parallel between the two types of restraint is strikingly revealed in the recent antitrust indictment brought against the West Coast Lumber
Manufacurers Association because of alleged abuses in the grade-marking of lumber.
Paragraph twenty-seven cites that the defendants, in furtherance of their conspiracy,
".... have drafted, sponsored and urged the enactment by towns and cities ...

of

building codes and ordinances, which provide for and result in the exclusive use in
building construction in said towns and cities of lumber bearing" defendants' grademark. As often, legislation or administration constitutes but the barriers effected
by groups which, routed in the competition of the market place, have been able to
make up in political influence what they lacked in economic power. There is thus
little to distinguish the public from the private barrier to attainment of the freemarket ideal; in the words of an able commentator, "The distinguishing feature of
governmental trade barriers is public sanction, not economic effect."' 0
Nevertheless, especially where, as here, the term barrier is comprehensively used
to embrace all manner of devices impinging adversely on maintenance of free market
access, governmental intervention does not necessarily import bad economic judgment. Public action may represent a justifiable effort to defeat or counterbalance a
private market force which, unchecked, will eventually destroy the very institutional foundations of the free market. Care must therefore be had to distinguish
between such defensive public measures and those which thinly cloak the prostitution of governmental processes for the benefit of private groups which seek to enjoy
for their monopolistic ambitions the blessings of public entrenchment. Nor is differentiation between these two classes of intervention sufficient; gradations in economic desirability or undesirability are inevitable within each type. Each public as
well as each private assertion of power over the market must be judged against a
composite measure of values that mirrors the marketing ideal.
Against this background there are presented in this issue fifteen analyses which
together probe, it is believed, at least the more important ramifications of the pervading problem of governmental marketing barriers. In structural scheme the symposium opens with two discussions, one general, the other specific, of interstate trade
barriers; follows with an analysis of the myriad types of non-geographical barriers
today raised to the entry of persons and goods into the market; pursues successively
an investigation into the more special restrictions on products and those on persons;
reunites the two streams of development in papers on effectuation of marketing barriers by municipalities and by administrative bodies; then considers the over-all
meaning of the general judicial tolerance of public barrier activity regardless of its
type and economic effect; and closes with two discussions which serve to emphasize
the significance of governmental marketing barriers both to our efforts at defense
against physical aggression from without and to the maintenance of a political and
industrial democracy at home that will withstand the dry rot which in other places
has so greatly facilitated foreign doctrinal penetration from within.
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